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Abstract: This study investigated five Chinese higher education institutions in relation to management of academic staff.
The study compared these practices with those used in three Australian universities. The results demonstrated that the
Chinese universities provide more freedom to academic staff in terms of how staff spend their time at the university. However,
there are more strict measures to control teaching staff’s punctuality in attending their classes and to have detailed planning
and teaching documentation. There are also additional teaching evaluations at both school and university levels, together
with student evaluation. Chinese higher education staff management places greater emphasis on extrinsic financial rewards
to improve staff performance than do their Australian counterparts. The income of Chinese academic staff is performance
based and closely connected to their teaching, supervision, research and management workload. This approach initially
came from the West and is now adopted by Chinese higher education management, reflecting Chinese socialist principles
regarding income distribution. This measure of distribution is a very important motivational factor designed to enhance
staff performance. This study provides an understanding as to the reasons why differences exist in management practices
in China and Australia and offers some explanations from historical, political and social culture perspectives. This research
identifies both positive and negative aspects of the two systems and suggests that learning good management practices from
each other may bring positive changes to the productivity of higher education in both countries.
Keywords: Chinese higher education, Academic staff management, Australian Practices
Introduction
SINCE 1978, CHINA has embraced gradualeconomic reforms to modernise the country,to improve the quality of life for its people
and to secure a better future for the country.
The reforms included cessation of traditional life-
long employment, so called “iron rice bowl”, in the
industry sector and many government agencies.
Productivity has been greatly improved. However,
at the same time, the system in the 1990s allowed
academics working in the higher education sector to
maintain an “iron rice bowl” and universities had no
power to terminate staff employment. Faculty staff
just needed to accumulate enough years and would
be eventually promoted, never demoted. The status
quo had spawned special interests and privileges
which often led to a lack of creativity and productiv-
ity. Academics had little pressure to perform and
departments were filled with people who had light
workloads. Many generated large amounts of extra
income via working for private universities or busi-
ness. (Lin, 2005)
In the late 1990s, the Chinese government signi-
ficantly increased the intake numbers of university
students which resulted in an average increase in
student enrolment of 30% a year during 1998-2001.
The universities have grown from an average size
of 1,600 students to 6,000 students and classes that
seat 30-40 students now accommodate more than
100. (Lin, 2005) There were 23 million university
students by the end of 2005 (Zhou, 2006). China
became the country with the highest number of uni-
versity students in the world. The staff-student ratio
reached nearly 1:17 by 2001, a dramatic increase
from a ratio of 1:3 in the early 1990s (Lin, 2005).
However, there are no Chinese universities listed
among the top 100 universities in the world. As a
result, there is a strong desire to have world-class
universities in China. For example, over the next 15
years the Beijing University is aiming to join the
world top 100 universities which are predominately
western universities (Lin, 2005). To achieve this,
there is an urgent need to improve the quality of
higher education and the management of university
staff. Westernization of Chinese universities, intro-
ducing competition and performance based reward
systems appear to be on the rise. Learning different
management approaches from different parts of the
world is one of the major changes in Chinese higher
education organisations. However, many of the
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management approaches adopted from theWest have
distinct Chinese culture characteristics.
One of the most important areas in Chinese higher
education reform has been the breakdown of the old
“iron rice bowl” mentality and improvements in
academics motivation in their teaching, updating
knowledge, producing high quality research out-
comes and educating a new generation of well-
trained, highly qualified labour force for global
competition in science, technology, military and
political spheres. The recent changes have steered
academic staff to work much harder to advance the
quality of their teaching and research productivity.
Australia is a country with a strong British influ-
ence. Its higher education system has many similar-
ities with that of Britain. In addition, Australia has
an individualism orientated culture (Hofstede, 2005).
The higher education management ideology also re-
flects this cultural characteristic.
During this current era of globalisation and in the
light of internationalisation of higher education, it is
necessary to understandmanagement practices from
different countries particularly, those with very dif-
ferent cultural backgrounds. China is a country that
has had enormous economic growth and is sending
increasing number of students and academics to study
in the West. Many have come to Australia. Further,
many western degree courses are delivered in China.
It is important for both Chinese and Australian
higher education managers to understand what is
happening in the other country in terms of their
management practices of academic staff.
This paper compares current major management
practices of academic staff in five Chinese higher
education institutions with that of management
within three Australian universities. It aims to present
insights into their different approaches, the historical,
political and social culture background underpinning
the differences. It is hoped that the research will
provide an in-depth understanding of the two systems
and mutual learning opportunities.
Methods
Document Analysis and Interviews
Five Chinese higher education institutions (four
universities and one TAFE college) were visited and
11 Chinese academic staff were interviewed regard-
ing their perceivedmanagement practices of academ-
ic staff. Documents regarding academic code of
conduct, rules and regulations, evaluation of teach-
ing, teaching and research load, salary structures
were collected.
Documentation from three Australian universities
regarding their staff management policies, collective
agreements, policies on employment conditions,
unsatisfactory performance, promotions were
downloaded from their internet sites. Three academic
staff from the Australian universities were inter-
viewed to gain insight into some of the management
practices.
Results and Discussions
Academic Staff Working Hours and
Workload
Academic staff in four of the five higher education
institutions researched in China do not need to follow
the rule of 8:00am-12:00, 2:00pm-6:00pm timetable
for their administrative staff. All have very limited
shared office space. Academic staff come in when
they teach classes and when they have meetings.
This is a common practice in universities in China.
The system has been in place since the early days of
the republic after the 1949 revolution. Only the
TAFE college researchedwas the exception. Accord-
ing to a staff member at this college who complained
about their strict timetable, it was the only higher
education institution in China that requires staff to
attend work from 8:00am-12:00 and 2:00pm to
6:00pm each day.
The interviews revealed thatmost Chinese academ-
ic staff take very little responsibility in course man-
agement, such as course coordination, answer pro-
spective student inquiries, selection of new students,
give approval for student graduation etc. These duties
belong to the Department of Teaching Affairs within
the universities. However, some academic staff do
take students to the practicum part of their studies
wherever appropriate such as schools, communities
etc. Many academics also work as classroom teach-
ers1. Staff do research after teaching hours at their
own home or at a library wherever and whenever
they like. In addition, academic staff also have sum-
mer and winter holidays which amount to 6 and 4
weeks respectively. The teaching hours for the year
to fulfill required workload varied between 54 hours
to 432 hours in the five institutions. The four univer-
sities have the load capped at 288 hours. Only the
TAFE institution researched has a load of 432 hours.
The Chinese universities and TAFE institutions have
18 weeks in each semester. Therefore, the teaching
load is 1.5 – 8 hours per week for university staff,
12 hours per week for the TAFE college staff.
1 In Chinese universities, enrolments in a particular course are usually organised into manageable classes. For example, one course has an
intake of 120 students in one year. These 120 students are likely to be divided into three classes, approximately 40 students in each class.
These 40 students comprise a group unit. They study and do many other activities together. A classroom teacher, normally an academic
staff, is assigned to the group.
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In contrast, the Australian universities researched
require their academic staff to attend work five days
a week in their appointment letters and collective
agreements. 20 working days of annual leave are
available to all staff in addition to public holidays.
However, in reality, many academic staff have alloc-
ated one day a week as their research day and they
may not be visible in their office on that day. In one
school of one of the universities researched, fulltime
academic staff are require to teach between 11-12
hours per week in each of the 13 week semester. This
is equivalent to 286 – 312 hours of teaching per year,
a similar teaching load in total to the Chinese. How-
ever, it is much higher per week than their Chinese
university counterparts. In addition, many middle
level academic staff in Australia are responsible for
some management duties such as course coordina-
tion. It involves selection of students prior to each
academic year, writing course documentations, an-
swering prospective student inquires, advising stu-
dents on their selection of units to fulfil course re-
quirements, management of student enrolment, ap-
prove student graduation, involvement in courses
committee and course review etc. The Australian
academic staff’s course management duties require
them to be available for the students. As a con-
sequence, they need to be in their office for most of
the time during the week.
In China, students are required to enrol in a larger
number of compulsory units; limited elective units
are available. This makes their decision-making
easier in terms of their selection of units and enrol-
ment. Therefore, it is possible for the Department of
Teaching Affairs within each university to manage
enrolment. There is also a Recruitment Department
to answer prospective students’ questions. The
number of students in each course is large, over 100
students in each intake in more than 70% of the
courses at the five Chinese higher education institu-
tions researched. Very few ourses with a small enrol-
ment exist. All these make the centralised manage-
ment of student recruitment, enrolment, and gradu-
ation possible in China. As a result, most academic
staff do not need to be involved in course manage-
ment as part of their work. This practice has allowed
most Chinese academic staff to spend more time in
their teaching and research activities.
By contrast in Australian universities, there are
many small undergraduate courses which may have
under 40 students in each intake. In one of the
schools of the Australian universities researched,
there were 6 undergraduate courses on offer, 4
(66.7%) have an intake of under 40 each year. There
are also many electives available, more flexibility in
the course in terms of what units students may
choose. Further, students often change courses and
universities, take leave or withdraw from studies.
Cross institutions credit transfers are often required.
Therefore it is desirable for a designated person who
knows the course well to manage student affairs, in-
terpret the course requirements and advise students
in unit selections. Individual freedom of choice and
recognition of individual needs are accommodated.
The different roles of academics in Australian and
China reflect different cultural traditions, population
and availability of resources. Australia is an individu-
alist culture orientated society. In individualist soci-
eties, individual choice and freedom are emphasised
(Triands, 1995). Many small courses in Australian
universities are designed to suit individual student
needs. Australia also has a small population. As a
result, the number of students in each course is
smaller than that in the courses in China. The small
numbers, diverse course structures andmore electives
make it possible andmaybe desirable for an academ-
ic to be the course coordinator managing the course
and student affairs. However, a large amount of time
is consumed in course management. There is less
time for teaching and research. The large numbers
in each course in China make central management
possible and improve the efficiency of course man-
agement. In reality the management of courses by
administrative staff free up the academic staff. Aca-
demic staff can be more effectively engaged in
teaching and research activities. According to Aus-
tralian National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU)
(2000), administrative responsibilities have been
identified as one of the major stressors for Australian
academics within the workplace. A NTEU survey
indicated that the average fulltime Australian female
academics worked 51.9 hours per week, males 53.3
hours per week. This exceeds 10 hours in each
working day.
How is Financial Reward used as a
Motivation Factor?
One of the major socialist principles in relation to
income distribution in China is “the more people
work, the more they obtain financially”, “distribution
of income according to people’s work”. This prin-
ciple is reflected strongly in current university staff
payment and acts as an important part of staff man-
agement.
All Chinese higher education institutions re-
searched have very detailed and complex payment
formulas to reflect the years the staff worked, the
level of their appointment, their teaching hours, the
number of post graduate students supervised, their
research publications/grants attained, together with
other university work participated in such as obser-
vation and evaluation of staff teaching, supervision
of student field work, military training and practicum
etc.
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Approximately 1/2 to 1/3 of income of Chinese
academic staff is contingent on the hours of their
teaching, supervision and research outcomes. The
hourly teaching rate is based on the income generat-
ing ability of the college/school or university, varying
between 21 -100 yuan per hour. It would appear that
all five institutions generate a large amount of money
to pay their academic staff for their teaching. How-
ever, some institutions do pay their academic staff
better than the others. For individual staff, the pay-
ment rate for each hour of their teaching is based on
their level of appointment. For example, an associate
professor is paid approximately 20% higher for each
hour he/she teaches than that of a lecturer. Several
of the Chinese staff interviewed teach up to 20 hours
per week due to the financial rewards. It would ap-
pear there is considerable incentive to be promoted
and teach more hours or do equivalent work.
Further, success in research and publications is
directly connected to financial reward. The Chinese
institutions researched all have a complex quantitat-
ive formula to calculate academic staff research
achievement each year. The scores are calculated
based on the level of the publication, e.g. AAA or
AA or A or B… level of journals, the amount of
words appearing in the publication, the rank as an
author in the team, the research grant (including
quantity and quality) obtained etc. For example,
publishing a paper in an AAA national top level
journal will give the staff a score of 300 points. If
the staff can obtain a research grant as one of the
National Natural or Social Sciences major projects,
similar to an Australian Research Council (ARC)
grant, the researcher could be granted up to 1,600
points.
In the five Chinese higher education institutions
researched, each level of appointment has a publica-
tion target, e.g. a professor needs to accumulate a
score of 200 points each year, associate professor
160, lecturer 120, assistant lecturer 60 etc. If the
academic staff publish a paper, he/she will be rewar-
ded financially according to the levels of publication,
e.g. between 200- 600 yuan at the TAFE college,
between 2,000-8,000 yuan at three of the four univer-
sities. However, if the academics cannot reach the
target, they will be penalised. Depending on the in-
stitution, some are deducted in their research relevant
allowances, others are demoted to a lower classifica-
tion or increment. In the Chinese TAFE college, an
associate professor could be demoted to a lecturer if
he/she did not reach the target for two years. By us-
ing these rewards and penalties, the academics inter-
viewed in this research were visibility feeling the
pressure and expressed a great desire to improve
their research publications.
In Australian universities, academic staff are paid
according to their respective level of appointment.
The levels are from A to E. There are 4 to 8 incre-
ments in each level except level E. Once staff reach
the top increment of their respective level, further
improvement in terms of payment comes from pro-
motion via application by the individual. It would
appear there is no direct connection between salary
and hours of teaching, number of students staff su-
pervise and publications. Only one university made
a loose connection between the whole university
staff performances and pay. In their collective
agreement between the union and the university, it
states: “additional salary increases equivalent to
1.00% of salary will be paid in the event that the
University achieves:
1. a “top ten” national ranking in learning and
teaching as assessed by the Commonwealth
Learning and Teaching Performance Fund alloc-
ations for each of 2007 and 2008;
2. top rank status on at least three of the four indic-
ators of National Research Competitiveness in
each of 2006 and 2007; and
3. fee revenue growth of at least $21million a year
in each of 2007 and 2008.”
This is called an “Earning Esteem Incentive”
payable to all eligible staff of the university.
There are workload meetings to balance staff
workload in Australian universities. Equality is
stressed amongst staff in terms of teaching hours,
managerial duties and supervision load. For example,
if a staff member is teaching a large unit with 200
students, there will be 17-20 hours of teaching per
week required to cover both lecture and tutorials2.
Once the standard teaching hours/load, e.g. 12 hours
per week, is reached, the extra hours required in this
unit will be taught by other staff members or session-
al staff. Sessional staff are casual staff. They are
normally post graduate students who take some tu-
torial teaching duties to supplement their income and
gain work experiences. They are paid by the hours
they teach. The hourly rate is much higher than the
academics employed on a continuing base. However,
there is little job security and other entitlements.
This system of payment is part of collective
agreements struck between the Australian National
Tertiary Education Union and the university manage-
ments throughout Australia. National collective bar-
gaining provides a framework of pay scales and en-
sures some uniformity of practice across the sector.
There are small incentives in terms of research pub-
lications and application for research grants. How-
ever, the money is to remain in the staff consultancy
fund for research and work related use. Further, the
2 This figure is calculated as two hours lecture per week and 1.5 hours tutorial per student in a tutorial group under 20 students.
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proportion of those incentives is very small in rela-
tion to staff salary, it is not sufficient to act as a major
extrinsic motivator.
The Australian higher education system has
evolved from the British university system, based
on a consideration for a “liberal profession”, academ-
ics are perceived to value and be capable of exer-
cising considerable autonomy overmacro issues such
as governance and institutional direction. They are
intrinsically motivated (Schwartzmann,1994). They
regulate themselves and strike a bargain with society,
providing advice to society in return for freedom
from lay supervision. (Winstanly, Sorabji &Dawson,
1995)
In recent years, Australianmanagement has placed
increased emphasis on performance-based remuner-
ation to stimulate high performance and enhance
productivity in the context of intensified global
competition (Hanley & Nguyen, 2005). This phe-
nomenon is related to the equality theory (Adams,
1965). The theory suggests that pay satisfaction de-
rives from how fairly employees see themselves as
being treated in procedural and distributive terms
relative to significant others within and beyond the
organisations. The clearer the link between effort
and reward, the fairer the perceived treatment, the
greater satisfaction with pay. This theory implies
greater pay satisfaction and a greater motivation ef-
fect where the relationship between effort and per-
formance is transparent and the relationship between
performance goals and pay is clear. (Kessler, Heron
& Gagnon, 2006)
The Chinese performance-related pay practices
were learnt from theWest after the reform. The “iron
rice bowl” ideology and related egalitarian payment
practices were dominant in Chinese higher education
for more than 40 years. Academics did little research,
their teaching load was low and there were no key
performance indicators (Lin 2005). There was no
clear connection between effort and financial reward;
a lack of progressive spirit in the higher education
sector was clearly evident at that time.
In this historical context, to break the “iron rice
bowl”mentality, to improve productivity and to catch
up with the world’s elite universities, a more account-
able system was required. It would appear that the
Chinese performance-related pay practice is designed
to achieve this in a bid to break from the past. It is a
highly extrinsic motivated reward practice. The re-
ward systemwas very carefully structured to encour-
age staff to teach more classes and conduct quality
research in order to achieve excellence in higher
education in China.
Most of the Chinese academics interviewed be-
lieved that the current reward system and manage-
ment were fair. They acknowledged the intense
pressure and competition. However, it was perceived
that management was bringing the best out of the
academics.
Although unions and performance-related pay are
well-established institutions in the Australian labour
market, they are based on stark contrasting ideologies
and cultures. The first institution reflects the old no-
tion of “collectivism” in industrial relations, while
the second reflects “individualism” in the employ-
ment relationship, allowing individual remuneration
to be tailored to individual performance. (Hanley &
Nguyen, 2005)
Marshall’s (1998) and O’Donnell’s (1998) ex-
amined the nature and scope of performance-related
pay introduced in Australian federal and state public
sectors and revealed that despite the growing popular-
ity of performance-related pay, the design and imple-
mentation of these schemes was often poor. Critics
of this reward approach often point to the divisive
nature of the system. It is argued that paying staff in
such a way has the potential to lower morale within
the otherwise collegiate teaching profession, increase
bureaucratic control, and lead to demotivation and
add pressure among staff (Tomazin, 2007).
Given the perceived negative impacts, unions are
resistant to the use of performance-related pay sys-
tems. Traditional union arguments against such
measures are: work intensification and managerial
control; erosion of collectivism; union exclusion and
the rise of individual contracts. Incentive schemes
may increase an individual’s performance but they
also introduce tension and stress, thus reducing satis-
faction. (Hanley&Nguyen, 2005). Higher education
in Australia has traditionally been a union stronghold.
In 2004, there were just over 33,000 full-time and
fractional academic staff employed in Australia’s
higher education system, approximately 16,000
academics were members of the National Tertiary
Education Union (NTEU) (Robinson, 2006). This
explains one of themajor reasons why in an individu-
alist orientated Australian culture, a performance-
related pay system has not been fully implemented
into the higher education sector. It would appear both
positive and negative outcomes can derive from both
Chinese and Australian higher education reward
systems. The utilisation of their respective ap-
proaches is closely related to their historical, political
and social culture context.
Rules, Regulations and Penalties with
regard to Punctuality in Relation to
Teaching Classes and Supervision of
Examinations
In Chinese universities, it is evident that clear rules
and regulations regarding a code of conduct for aca-
demics are in place for a strict control on punctuality
of staff attendance in teaching and examinations.
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These rules, regulations and relevant penalties are
published in hard copies and placed on university
websites. Teaching incidents such as lateness for
classes or missed classes are strictly forbidden. Uni-
versities documents reveal that there are three levels
of teaching incident and related penalities:
The first level: the most severe incidents include
missing a one hour class or late for class for more
than one hour without a good reason; early release
of examination content, examination paper was not
prepared or completed by the time of the examina-
tion; the principal examination supervisor did not
arrive on time for the examination; losing student
examination results; examination supervisor did not
take responsibility which led to many students
cheating during an examination. Further, any content
or language used in the classes against the Commun-
ist Party’s Four Basic Principals are also categorised
as most severe teaching incidents.
The penalties for this level of incident may involve
publicly identifying the incident and the person re-
sponsible to the whole university/TAFE college, a
warning as a disciplinary action, deduction of a
whole year’s bonus or teaching allowance and
delayed promotion for two years.
The second level: moderate incidents. These in-
clude lateness for teaching classes between 5minutes
to 1 hour (one university is 15 minutes to 1 hour)
without a good reason; without approval by the
school, not teaching more than ¼ of the teaching
content prescribed in the teaching outline designed
by the department; due to lecturer’s mistake in in-
struction or non appearance in class without approv-
al, causing damage to university equipment or prop-
erty or student injuries; change student examination
results without approval.
This level of incident can result in publicly notify-
ing the incident and the name of the responsible
person to the whole university; deduct 3 months bo-
nus or teaching allowance.
The third level: general/common incident. This
level of incident includes the lecturer applying for
leave, however, the manager not notifying students
resulting in students waiting for more than 15
minutes; lecturer late for his/her class for 2-5 minutes
(one university is over 5 minutes); due to examina-
tion papers not ready or the supervisor not attending
the examination on time, the examination is delayed
for 5-30 minutes.
This level of incident will result in publicly noti-
fying the incident and the responsible person to the
whole school, with a subsequent deduction of 1
month bonus or teaching allowance. In the TAFE
college researched, the annual bonus for the whole
school would be deducted by 50,000 to 100,000
Yuan (approximately A$8,333-A$16,667) in the
event of any of the three levels of incident, an ex-
traordinary amount of money in China. All staff in
the school will share the pain and be paid less in their
annual bonus.
The offender at all three levels will also need to
submit a written self-criticism letter to the head of
the school.
However, at Australian universities, no documents
could be found explicitly revealing such detailed
regulation in attending teaching, examination duties
and relevant penalties.
The difference between these two very different
ways of handling punctuality may be attributed to
the reality that most Chinese academic staff are not
required to stay on campus when they have no
classes. Perhaps there is a need, from a Chinese
management perspective, to ensure that academic
staff do arrive on time for their teaching responsibil-
ities. Clear regulations and severe punishments are
effective ways of managing punctuality in Chinese
culture. By comparison, most Australian academics
normally have an office space and are required to be
at work everyday. The possibility of being late for
classes and examinations is not so great.
Chinese culture is high on collective national cul-
ture scales. There is a tendency for external control
from a management perspective (Deresky, 2000). In
China, clear regulations and related punishment are
important management approaches to exercise con-
trol. Further, Chinese have a weak uncertainty
avoidance culture. People in such cultures are more
relaxed and less anxious. However, punctuality may
not be emphasised (Hofstede, 2005). Late arrivals
are common in business practices and even airline
arrivals. To ensure teaching punctuality, it is neces-
sary to implement strict measures. These measures
appear to be effective. According to the interviewees
and observations by the researchers, staff in the five
Chinese higher education institutions were strictly
following the regulation.
In contrast, in one of the Australian universities,
according to the staff interviewed, some academics
often arrive a little late for their lectures and tutorials,
due partly to no clear penalty or accountability for
these behaviours. It would appear punctuality has
never become an issue at this university. Self-discip-
line is relied upon when managing time in Australia.
Little external control is placed on academic staff in
this perspective of their work.
Evaluation of Staff Teaching
In terms of management of teaching quality, different
Chinese higher education institutions have slightly
different assessment methods. However, all utilise
a combination of student evaluation of teaching and
senior professional panel evaluations.
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Normally, 20-40% of the evaluation marks come
from students and 30-35% from a panel comprised
of senior academics within the university. They ob-
serve classes according to a set of criteria, checking
teaching plans, lecture notes and mark the teaching
accordingly. The other 30-35% of the marks come
from another panel organised by the respective
school/department. The Chinese TAFE college also
implements peer evaluation, amounting to 20% of
the total marks. The evaluations are conducted once
a year.
In one Chinese university, the evaluation results
are ranked against other staff within the university.
In the case of all the Chinese institutions researched,
senior management of the department and the univer-
sity hold the results. According to their official doc-
uments, the evaluation results will have implications
on financial rewards and penalties. Staff with excel-
lent teachingmarks are rewarded with certificate and
money such as a bonus, or 20% increase in allow-
ances. In the TAFE college, staff will be upgraded
in increment. For staff who do not pass the evalu-
ation, a yellow card is issued and marks will be de-
ducted in the annual assessment. Furthermore, the
hourly payment of teaching may be deducted by up
to 50% at three of the four universities. At the remain-
ing university all the university allowances would
be withheld. In the TAFE college, the level of ap-
pointment will be dropped by one level. However,
the deduction of salarymay not be strictly implemen-
ted according to one of the interviewees from one
university.
In Australian universities, it would appear student
evaluation is the only evaluation of staff teaching
and their experiences of staff supervision. There are
other forms of evaluations/surveys such as quality
of administrative and support services for students,
graduate destination survey, and course experience
questionnaire. They are all in the form of seeking
student opinions in relation to the quality of the
education they experienced. Observation by senior
management in classes appears not to exist. Further,
academic staff have rights not to disclose the results
of student evaluation on their teaching. It would ap-
pear in Australia, a highly individualist country,
evaluation and management of evaluation results are
associated with individual rights and privacy. Extern-
al interference is not encouraged (Heater, 1999).
Further, the purpose of evaluation is to provide
feedback to the individual for further improvement.
There are teaching awards both within the universit-
ies and nationwide within the higher education field.
Staff can be nominated. Submissions of evidence of
good teaching practices by the nominees are required.
The rewards focus more on recognition and honour
rather than financial.
Australian staff also experience performance ap-
praisal with their supervisor once a year. Staff
members are required to submit a portfolio and meet
with his/her supervisor. A staff member's annual
portfolio will comprise the following documents: an
engagement profile; an achievement report, including
teaching, research, managerial responsibilities and
community work; a career development plan; and
any supporting documentation relating to other
formal processes in the university such as tenure,
promotion, probation, etc. (where applicable). The
supervisor and staff member will then meet at least
annually to review the portfolio and to update it to
reflect the work unit's plans and priorities for the
forthcoming year. In this cycle, the outcomes from
student evaluation of teaching do play an important
role in demonstrating achievement of the staff in
teaching.
According to the three Australian universities
documents with regards to incremental increase, if
staff performance is satisfactory the supervisor will
recommend an incremental progression. If staff per-
formance is unsatisfactory, the salary increment in
salary will be withheld based on the supervisor’s re-
commendation. However, it would appear this rarely
happens in practice.
It is apparent that Chinese management of quality
of teaching focuses onmultiple levels of evaluations.
Evaluations by the senior management form an im-
portant part. This practice reflects the large power
distance of Chinese culture. In work and organisa-
tion, large power distance societies emphasise senior
management control and authority. Similarly, in
education, teachers are treated with respect and stu-
dents are encouraged to be obedient (Hofstede,
2001). In this cultural context, it is quite remarkable
progress to include student evaluation of a lecturer’s
teaching. Originally there was no evaluation at all
in the 1980’s. Only in the 1990’s was senior manage-
ment evaluation introduced to Chinese higher educa-
tion.
In the five Chinese higher education institutions,
all lecturers interviewed expressed their fear of being
marked down by students. They articulated that they
could not do anything to upset their students. Perhaps
this is a start towards a student centred learning and
students being treated as equals. Students are more
empowered and trusted. A more equal relationship
between lecturers and students may evolve and in-
deed be fostered.
Further, the multiple evaluations at Chinese uni-
versities place greater pressure on the teaching staff
to perform via seeking innovative approaches and
self advance in knowledge and skills. As a result, it
is an effective way to extrinsically motivate staff to
improve their teaching. However, in a liberal indi-
vidualist culture dominated Australian society, indi-
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viduals have undeniable rights to privacy (Heater,
1999). It is one of the major reasons why there is no
senior management evaluation taking place and all
evaluation results are returned to the individual, not
to senior management. The outcomes of the evalu-
ation on teaching are always retained by the individu-
al staff and disclosure of the results is totally subject
to the individual’s discretion.
Conclusions
This research revealed considerable differences
between Chinese and Australian university manage-
ment practices of their academic staff. It would ap-
pear that the Chinese universities provide more
freedom to academic staff in terms of how staff spend
their time at the university. However, there are more
strict measures to control teaching staff’s punctuality
in attending their classes. There are also multiple
staff teaching evaluations at both school and univer-
sity levels, together with student evaluation. The
evaluations have a more competitive nature and are
connected closely to financial reward.
In contrast, the Australian higher education man-
agement approaches follow more closely a liberal
individual ideology and trust an individual staff’s
ability to be responsible for their own behaviour in
terms of punctuality in teaching. Staff are not evalu-
ated by their senior management. However, staff
administrative workload is much greater than their
Chinese counterparts. This creates stress on Australi-
an academics. Nevertheless, Australian academics
receive a significant higher level of take-home in-
come, approximately 6 times their Chinese counter-
parts annually salary. However, the prices of goods
are much cheaper in China. The real purchasing
power difference is much less than the 6 times in
actual dollar terms.
The income of Chinese academic staff is closely
associated with their teaching, supervision, research
andmanagementworkload, reflectingChinese social-
ist principles regarding income distribution. This
measure of distribution is a very important motiva-
tional factor designed to improve staff performance.
Historically, breaking the “iron rice bowl” mentality
has been a driving force for this approach. It attempts
to ensure that people who work harder receive a
greater financial reward. Politically, the communist
party has learned from its past and adopted a socialist
principle with Chinese characteristics. Culturally,
these approaches are suited to Chinese collective
culture, together with a large power distance. It
would appear that Chinese academics have been
motivated to improve the quality of their teaching
and research.
However, some of the management practices used
in China that appear to be motivational cannot be
put into practice in the current Australian cultural
context, such as senior management evaluation and
comparison of evaluation outcomes amongst staff.
It is also very difficult to implement performance
related pay in Australian higher education sector
given the organisational cultural background of uni-
versities and the current workplace agreement debate
in the country. The Australian management ap-
proaches mainly rely on intrinsic motivation of staff,
the exception being when staff seek promotion.
However, if an academic does not seek promotion
and has reached the top increment of his/her relevant
level, it would appear little external control can be
exercised under the current management system.
Mediocrity could be a potential outcome.
This paper suggests that if Australian university
managements are really concerned about staff
workload, the Chinese practice of central manage-
ment of courses, recruitment and graduation should
be closely examined. It is apparent that Australian
academics could better use their time to improve
their teaching and research. Trained administrative
staff could well accomplish the course management
tasks.
References
Adams, J .S. (1965), “Inequity in social exchange”, in Berkowitz, L. (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,
Vol. 2, Academic Press, New York, NY, pp. 267-99.
Deresky, H. (2000). International management: Managing across borders and cultures. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Hanley, G. & Nguyen, L. (2005). Right on the money: What do Australian unions think of performance-related pay? Em-
ployee Relations 27 ( 2 ), 141-159.
Heater, D. (1999). What is citizenshi p ? Cambridge, Polity Press.
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequence: Comparing values, behaviours, institutions, and organisarions across nations.
London: Sage.
Hofstede, G. (2005). Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. London: McGraw-Hill book.
Kessler, I., Heron, P. & Gagnon, S. (2006). The fragmentation of pay determination in the British civil service: A union
member perspective. Personnel Review 35 (1), 6-28
Lin, J. (2005) China’s higher education reform and the Beida debate. Harvard China Review, Spring, 132-138.
Marshall, N. (1998), “Pay-for-performance systems: experiences in Australia”, Public Productivity &Management Review,
21(4), 403-18.
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF KNOWLEDGE, CULTURE AND CHANGE MANAGEMENT,
VOLUME 7
46
National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU), (2000), Unhealthy Places of Learning: Working in Australian Universities.
Retrieved 18 March, 2007 from World Wide Web: http://www.nteu.org.au/policy/current/stress/upl/fullreport
O’Donnell, M. (1998), Creating a performance culture? Performance-based pay in the Australian public service.Retrieved
16th April, 2007 from World Wide Web: http://www.cpsu.org.au/creating_a_performance_culture.htm
Robinson, D. (2006). The status of higher education teaching personnel in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Education International. Retrieved 16th April, 2007 from World Wide Web:
http://www.ei-ie.org/highereducation/file
Schewardzman, S. (1994). Academics as a profession: What does it mean? Does it matter? Higher Education Policy, 7(2),
24-26.
Tomazin, F. (2007). Pay as you learn. The Age, 11th April, p.13
Triandies, H. C. (1995). Individualism & Collectivism. San Francisco: Westview Press.
Winstanly, D., Sorabji, D. & Dawson, S. (1995) when the pieces don’t fit: A stakeholder power matrix to analyse public
sector restructuring. Public Money and Management, 15(2), 19-26.
Zhou, J. (2006) Evaluation of teaching is a critical approach in improving the quality of education. A speech by theMinister
of Education, P. R. China on 19th April, 2006, retrieved 6th April, 2007 from World Wide Web: ht-
tp://jwc.cufe.edu.cn/ypcj/index.asp.
About the Authors
Dr. Xiaoli Jiang
Dr. Xiaoli Jiang has diverse research interests in the areas of global migration and culture change, cross-culture
self-esteem, self-esteem and well-being of Asian migrants, and children's self-esteem.
Asst Prof. Xinhui Xu
Shenzhen Polytechnic, China
Asst Prof. Xiaoping Ma
Central Finance and Economics University, Beijing, China
Dr. Laurie Prosser
K.I.D.S. Foundation, Australia
47XIAOLI JIANG, XINHUI XU, XIAOPING MA, LAURIE PROSSER

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF KNOWLEDGE, CULTURE AND 
CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
 
 
EDITORS 
Mary Kalantzis, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA. 
Bill Cope, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA. 
 
 
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD 
Verna Allee, Verna Allee Associates, California, USA. 
Zainal Ariffin, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia. 
Robert Brooks, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. 
Bruce Cronin, University of Greenwich, UK. 
Rod Dilnutt, William Bethway and Associates, Melbourne, Australia. 
Judith Ellis, Enterprise Knowledge, Melbourne, Australia. 
Andrea Fried, Chemnitz University of Technology, Germany. 
David Gurteen, Gurteen Knowledge, UK. 
David Hakken, University of Indiana, Bloomington, Indiana, USA. 
Sabine Hoffmann, Macquarie University, Australia. 
Stavros Ioannides, Pantion University, Athens, Greece. 
Margaret Jackson, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. 
Paul James, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. 
Leslie Johnson, University of Greenwich, UK. 
Eleni Karantzola, University of the Aegean, Rhodes, Greece. 
Gerasimos Kouzelis, University of Athens, Greece. 
Krishan Kumar, University of Virginia, USA. 
Martyn Laycock, University of Greenwich and managingtransitions.net, UK. 
David Lyon, Queens University, Ontario, Canada. 
Bill Martin, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. 
Pumela Msweli-Mbanga, University of Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa. 
Claudia Schmitz, Cenandu Learning Agency, Germany. 
Kirpal Singh, Singapore Management University, Singapore. 
Dave Snowden, Cynefin Centre for Organisational Complexity, UK. 
Chryssi Vitsilakis-Soroniatis, University of the Aegean, Rhodes, Greece. 
 
 
Please visit the Journal website at http://www.Management-Journal.com for further information: 
- ABOUT the Journal including Scope and Concerns, Editors, Advisory Board, 
Associate Editors and Journal Profile 
- FOR AUTHORS including Publishing Policy, Submission Guidelines, Peer Review Process 
and Publishing Agreement 
 
 
SUBSCRIPTIONS  
The Journal offers individual and institutional subscriptions. For further information please visit 
http://ijm.cgpublisher.com/subscriptions.html. Inquiries can be directed to 
subscriptions@commongroundpublishing.com  
 
 
INQUIRIES 
Email: cg-support@commongroundpublishing.com 
